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Schauer: What Counts as Law?

Lectures
SEEGERS LECTURE
WHAT COUNTS AS LAW?
Frederick Schauer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Among Ronald Dworkin’s noteworthy contributions to contemporary
legal thought is his focus on what he called “theoretical disagreements in
law.”1 Dworkin used the term and the idea behind it as part of his larger
assault on what he understood as legal positivism, but my goal in this
Article is neither to attack nor defend positivism. Nor is it to attack or
defend Dworkin. Nevertheless, I want to follow Dworkin in reflecting on
the idea of theoretical disagreement in law, and indeed to follow him as
well in using Riggs v. Palmer2 as the initial vehicle for that reflection. 3 Still,
I will dissociate the idea of theoretical disagreement—and Riggs as well—
from either an attack on or a defense of legal positivism.4 Rather, my aim
is to suggest that what Riggs may best illustrate is a disagreement about
just what sources—or inputs, for those who prefer an uglier but less
theory-laden word—count as legitimate legal sources in the first instance.5
This disagreement, as opposed to disagreements about how to interpret
*

David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This
Article is the written version of the Seegers Lecture, delivered at the Valparaiso University
School of Law on September 8, 2016. I am grateful to the Valparaiso students and faculty for
their hospitality and their illuminating questions and comments, and also for the discussion
when drafts of this paper were presented at the L’Ecole du Droit, Sciences Po, Paris, on
January 19, 2017, at the Workshop on Theoretical Disagreement in Law held on April 1, 2017,
at the Duke University School of Law, and at a faculty seminar at the Australian National
University on October 20, 2016.
1
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 5 (1986).
2
See 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889) (disallowing claim to inheritance by one who has
murdered the testator).
3
See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 15.
4
Dworkin’s use of Riggs and the idea of theoretical disagreement is vigorously and
effectively challenged in Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. R.
1215, 1216 (2009). But it is perhaps worth emphasizing that the account of theoretical
disagreement I offer in this Article is best located within and not as a challenge to a broadly
positivist understanding of the nature of law.
5
The present article thus continues a project exemplified earlier in Frederick Schauer,
Constitutional Invocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295, 1305–06 (1997), and Frederick Schauer,
The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, The Limited
Domain of the Law].
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or apply those sources, is what I understand as a theoretical disagreement,
or at least as one form of a theoretical disagreement. What makes the
disagreement about the identity of the legitimate sources or inputs a
theoretical one is precisely that some sort of theory of what counts as law
lies near the foundation of what just law is within some jurisdiction. A
theory of legitimate (or valid) legal sources is thus at least part of a theory
of law, even if that theory is a local (or particular) theory—a theory of law
here and now, and not a theory of law in every place and at every time. 6
I suspect that Dworkin, in using Riggs as one of his earliest and most
prominent examples,7 had something in mind that is in the vicinity of
what I want to put forth here. But I suspect as well that Dworkin, who
was so set on attacking what he understood legal positivism to be, and
who himself was more inclined to see disagreement in the face of largely
compatible accounts or interpretations than might have been necessary or
desirable, would have been less sympathetic with what I say here than I
think he ought to have been. But that is largely by way of an aside, if only
to make clear that what follows is an account of a kind of theoretical
disagreement that for me was inspired by Dworkin, but which in no way
purports to be Dworkinian exegesis. More importantly, what follows is
an exploration of the question of just what counts as law or what counts
as a legitimate source of law, or an acceptable source of guidance in
making legal decisions. This question lies at the heart of understanding
how law operates, and is an important dimension of what distinguishes
law from other institutions of guidance and decision-making.8 The
question of theoretical disagreement is a useful entry into this larger
question, and it is the larger question—the domain of legitimate legal
sources—that is my principal concern in this Article.

See WILFRID E. RUMBLE, Introduction, in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED vii, xiii (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995) (distinguishing general from particular
jurisprudence); BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 10–12 (3d ed., 2003)
(discussing the possibility of a general jurisprudence); John C. Gray, Some Definitions and
Questions in Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. L. REV. 21, 34–35 (1892) (discussing different types of
jurisprudence); Danny Priel, Evaluating Descriptive Jurisprudence, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 139, 157
(2007) (distinguishing descriptive from normative jurisprudence).
7
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23 (1977).
8
See FREDRICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 154–67 (2015) (exploring the differentiation
of law from other social institutions). See also Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal
Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1082 (1997) (examining various forms
of differentiation of law).
6
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II. RIGGS V. PALMER, AGAIN
As is well known,9 Riggs v. Palmer was the 1889 case in which the New
York Court of Appeals confronted a series of events that commenced
when Elmer Palmer fatally poisoned his grandfather, Francis Palmer. 10
Elmer had been named as the principal beneficiary in his grandfather’s
will, and killed his grandfather not only to accelerate Elmer’s inheritance,
but also to forestall the feared possibility that Francis would change his
will to Elmer’s detriment.11 Elmer’s plan was negated when he was
apprehended, tried, and convicted for the killing, and then found his
inheritance negated by the Court of Appeals. 12 What made the case
especially noteworthy, then and now, was that the court denied Elmer the
inheritance, notwithstanding the explicit language of the New York
Statute of Wills, language which provided that named beneficiaries would
inherit upon the death of a testator who was of sound mind when making
the will, and language that contained no exceptions for murdering heirs.13
Because following the Statute of Wills to its literal indication would have
conflicted with the venerable, even if not as explicit, principle that “no
person shall profit from his own wrong,”14 the Court of Appeals majority
employed the latter to override the consequences of the former.15
Although Judge Gray’s dissenting opinion 16 relied almost entirely on the
words of the New York Statute of Wills, 17 and although the majority
See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 7–26 (2011) (providing by far the best
discussion of Riggs, its facts, its history, and its implications). See also BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40 (1921) (analyzing Riggs); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW 80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (examining Riggs); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 140–41 (1999); A.W. BRIAN
SIMPSON, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPTS OF LAW 211–12 (Oxford University Press 2011);
Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the Murdering Heir, 51 SMU L.
REV. 31 (2000); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1907)
(criticizing Riggs); Wills-Murder of the Testator by Legatee, 3 HARV. L. REV. 230, 234 (1889)
(describing and commenting on Riggs).
10
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889).
11
Id. at 189.
12
Id. at 191.
13
Id. at 189 (“It is quite true that [the] statutes regulating the making, proof, and effect of
will and the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their force and effect can in
no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this property to the
murderer”).
14
Id. at 190 (describing the principles that no one shall be permitted to profit from his own
fraud, or take advantage of his own wrong, or found any claim upon his own iniquity, or
acquire property by his own crime).
15
Id. at 191.
16
Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191.
17
Id. at 192–93.
9
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agreed with the dissent’s understanding on what those words meant, 18
Judge Earl’s majority opinion, in reaching a conclusion contrary to the
plain meaning of the most plainly applicable statute, relied on Roman law,
the Napoleonic Code, the books of various ancient writers, the law of
Quebec, and, most notably, the principle (which Judge Earl may or may
not have extracted from the foregoing sources) “that no person may profit
from his own wrong.”19 What was most important for Dworkin, of course,
was this last, because Dworkin believed, probably incorrectly, that the “no
person may profit from his own wrong” principle was not something that
had been or even could be recognized by a Hartian rule of recognition. 20
Dworkin’s reading of New York law or of legal positivism aside,
however, the contrasting opinions in Riggs do suggest that the majority
and the dissent had a disagreement about just what was to count as law,
with the majority’s capacious view encompassing all of the
aforementioned sources, and the dissent’s much narrower view
insisting—indeed quite explicitly—that none of the items in this ragbag of
sources counted as law at all.21 The theoretical disagreement was not a
See text accompanying infra notes 23–24.
Riggs, 22 N.E. at 192.
20
As theorized by H.L.A. Hart, a rule of recognition is a secondary rule (a rule about a
rule) that determines whether some primary rule of conduct will or will not count as a valid
legal rule. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–110 (Penelope A. Bulloch, Joseph Raz &
Leslie Green eds., 3d ed., Oxford University Press 2012) (1961). The ultimate rule of
recognition is, for Hart, the system-wide rule that determines what kinds of rules and other
sources will count as law within the entire system. Id. As I have suggested elsewhere,
thinking of the ultimate rule of recognition as a rule at all may be somewhat misleading, and
it is probably better to understand it as a set of practices—of lawyers and judges,
principally—that serves to make some but not all sources valid, and some but not all forms
of argument (sociologically) acceptable. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Rule of Recognition a
Rule?, 3 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012).
The most extensive development of the argument that what Dworkin thought
unrecognized by a Hartian ultimate rule of recognition was in fact already part of the ruleof-recognition-recognized law is in NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
THEORY 229–64 (1978). MacCormick’s point was largely by way of an existence theorem–
what Dworkin claimed could not be recognized had in fact been recognized and adopted as
part of the positive law. Id. The broader argument that a rule of recognition could recognize
moral principles such as “no person may profit from his own wrong” even if they had not
been adopted by a narrower conception of positive law is at the core of the incorporationist,
or inclusive positivist, challenge to Dworkin’s claims. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 103
(2001) (explaining and defending incorporationism); W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL
POSITIVISM 74–75 (Oxford University Press 1994) (same, but with different label).
21
See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191–92 (“[t]he appellants’ argument is not helped by reference to
those rules of the civil law, or to those laws of other governments, by which the heir, or
legatee, is excluded from benefit under the testament if he has been convicted of killing, or
attempting to kill, the testator. In the absence of such legislation here, the courts are not
empowered to institute such a system of remedial justice.”).
18
19
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disagreement about the idea of a rule of recognition, as we might imagine
a dispute between jurisprudes of different stripes to be. Rather, the
dispute here was one about the content of the rule of recognition as it
existed in New York in 1889—a disagreement about just what kinds of
sources would be recognized within the jurisdiction and its judicial
system as valid legal sources.
III. THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENT?
Most legal disagreements are not theoretical in the sense I offer here.
That is, they are not disputes about which items do or do not count as
appropriate sources for a legal argument or a judicial decision. When
Justices Black and Frankfurter were disagreeing about incorporation—
about which rights in the Bill of Rights (or elsewhere) would be
understood as part of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applied to the
states22—for example, they did not disagree about whether the Bill of
Rights was part of the Constitution, and they did not disagree about
whether the Fourteenth Amendment restricted certain forms of state
action.23 They disagreed “only” about how to interpret the Constitution
(including the Bill of Rights), but it is noteworthy that they did not
disagree about the makeup of the field of items that they were
interpreting.24
Similarly, consider the recent and amusing case of Yates v. United
States,25 in which the question was whether a fish was to be deemed a
“tangible object” for purposes of the destruction of evidence provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.26 That Act was plainly directed towards
financial institutions and financial transactions, and not towards the
prosecution of fishermen charged with taking undersized groupers. 27 But
as long as fish were understood to be tangible objects, the statute appeared
Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 86 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (applying
the Bill of Rights to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment), with Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing against Black’s “jot for jot” view of
incorporation). See generally Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253,
258 (1982) (explaining Justice Black’s argument for the Fourteenth Amendment’s total
incorporation of the Bill of Rights); Sanford Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication – A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 324–27 (1957) (analyzing historical
aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23
See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 85–86; Griffin 351 U.S. at 22.
24
See supra note 23.
25
135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
26
See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (providing that destruction of a “tangible object” with intent
to impede an investigation of the United States shall be fined or imprisoned, or both).
27
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)) (penalizing the destruction of evidence in response to the Enron
scandal).
22
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to be as applicable to Mr. Yates’ attempt to avoid prosecution by throwing
evidence into the sea as it was to the document-shredding practices of
financial institutions, the practices that motivated the statutory provision
in the first place. The Supreme Court divided along familiar lines, 28 with
Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion relying on statutory purpose to
exclude Mr. Yates from the reach of the Act, and Justice Kagan’s dissent
treating the plain language of the statute as virtually conclusive. 29 But
although there was a disagreement between the majority and the
dissenters about the application of the statute, about the principles of
interpretation to be applied, and thus about the meaning of the relevant
language, there was no (or at least not very much) disagreement about
what was being interpreted, nor was there very much disagreement about
what kinds of considerations could be brought to bear on that
interpretation.
This kind of basic agreement about what is being interpreted—the
target of the interpretation—also characterizes much (and probably most)
common law adjudication. Thus, although Judge Cardozo for the
majority and Judge Bartlett in his dissent disagreed about the outcome in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,30 disagreed as well about the answers to the
policy questions involved in the case, and disagreed about how to
interpret a collection of precedents from New York and other American
and common law jurisdictions, they did not disagree about whether these
were the sources to be used and interpreted,31 and thus appeared not to
disagree, or at least not to disagree very much, about the question of what
was to count as a legitimate source for a judicial decision.32
Thus, in contrast to the incorporation cases, to Yates, and to
MacPherson, Riggs v. Palmer embodies a disagreement at a deeper level.
Riggs is not about how to understand an agreed-upon set of sources, but
instead represents a disagreement about what constitutes the relevant set
28
See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083–87, 1090–93 (disagreeing on whether tossing fish overboard
was destruction of a tangible object sufficient to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
29
See id.
30
111 N.E. 1050, 1055, 1057 (N.Y. 1916).
31
Although Judge Bartlett’s dissenting opinion relied largely on the precedential effect of
several previous New York decisions, his lengthy quotation of the opinions in those
decisions, as opposed to merely noting their existence, supports the inference that he agreed
with the substance of those decisions as a matter of policy, and was not relying solely on the
stare decisis effect of their very existence. Id. at 1053, 1055. See Larry Alexander, Constrained
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 (1989) (explaining the nature of an argument from
precedent); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 123, 124 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (discussing the difference between vertical and
horizontal precedent and the respective weight of authority that they exert on subsequent
decisions).
32
See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055.
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of sources in the first instance. And it is this kind of disagreement that
might plausibly be understood as a theoretical disagreement, a form of
disagreement that is arguably both different from and deeper than a
(mere) interpretive disagreement.
IV. SOURCE DISAGREEMENT AS THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENT
Implicit in the above discussion is that one form of theory about law
is a theory about legitimate and illegitimate, or valid and invalid,
sources—a theory that, when applied, marks the difference between
“counts as law” and “does not count as law.” And thus a disagreement
about what does or does not count as law is one form of theoretical
disagreement about law. Here again Dworkin is suggestive, although
again in ways that he would most likely resist. Thus, in talking about the
two stages of interpretation,33 Dworkin appears to distinguish an initial
question of what it is that the legal interpreter is interpreting—the field of
interpretation—from the interpretive process that is subsequently applied
to that field.34 First the interpreter identifies the field, and then she extracts
meaning or import (interprets) from the items in this pre-identified field.35
A theoretical disagreement, which we might contrast with an interpretive
disagreement, is accordingly a disagreement about what is in the field in
the first place and not about what is to be done with some field.
See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 65–67 (explaining the two stages of the interpretation
process).
34
Id.
35
These days it is fashionable, especially among some of those with sympathies to
original-public-meaning originalism, to distinguish between interpretation and
construction. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING, 5–7 (1999) (analyzing the differing relationships to
constitutional text held by interpretation and construction). See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 455–56 (2013) (emphasizing the prominent role of constitutional construction in
recent theories of originalism); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American
Constitution, 27 CONST. COMM. 119, 120–22 (2010) (discussing the limitations of interpretation
and how construction can expand beyond those limitations). But because even the initial
stage of interpretation requires not only a law-soaked account of what should be interpreted
in the first instance, but also a legally-informed determination of whether the language to be
interpreted should be interpreted as ordinary or technical language, it is not at all clear that
the distinction between interpretation and construction (or between communicative content
and legal content, see Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479, 503 (2013)), if designed to track a distinction between meaning and legal
import, can do the work that is required of it. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against Construction,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 771–72 (2009) (questioning the interpretation-construction
distinction); Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 502–
03 (2015) (same).
33
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Interpreters may differ about how, for example, to understand a particular
artistic movement—Expressionism, or Impressionism, or Minimalism, or
Futurism, or whatever—but the question of how to understand what joins
a particular group of artists is different from the question of who is to
count as a member of the group in the first instance. Indeed, virtually any
form of coherence or holistic reasoning or decision-making involves the
same issue,36 because an initial step is to identify the items that will then
be used by the decision-maker to construct the explanation, and only after
the field is identified can the constructive process begin.37
A theoretical disagreement, however, is not merely a disagreement
about the tokens that make up the field. Rather, it is a disagreement about
the types of materials, sources, or inputs that belong in the field. If,
counterfactually, Judge Earl for the majority in Riggs had relied on
Pufendorf and Blackstone and if Judge Gray for the dissent had relied on
Bacon and Rutherford, there would have been a disagreement about the
actual makeup of the field of relevant sources, but not a disagreement
about the types of items that would or could constitute the interpretive
field. In actuality, Judge Earl’s reliance on Pufendorf, Blackstone, Bacon,
and Rutherford, inter alia, represented a willingness to rely on sources of
this type, a willingness that Judge Gray did not share,38 and thus there was
a genuine and deep disagreement between the majority and the dissent
about the very kinds of sources that could be used in addition to the more
conventional ones, ones whose use did not appear to be controversial. The
majority and the dissent had an interpretive disagreement not about the
interpretation of the conventional sources—the New York cases, the New
York statutes, and the cases from other American states—but a theoretical
disagreement about whether anything other than these sources could
permissibly even be part of a legal decision at all.
V. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND THE SOURCES OF LAW
Implicit in the foregoing is an intentional and admittedly
controversial conflation among “law,” “sources of law,” and “inputs into
judicial decision.” The issue is hardly beyond dispute. If, with the soSee AMALIA AMAYA, THE TAPESTRY OF REASON: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF
COHERENCE AND ITS ROLE IN LEGAL ARGUMENT, 361–419 (2015) (emphasizing and explicating
the distinction between locating the members of the field and deriving a relationship or
account that explains the membership).
37
I bracket the important question of the relationship between field construction (or field
identification) and field interpretation, especially because it may often be the case that some
items initially excluded will be included once a tentative explanation is extracted, and vice
versa. See AMAYA, supra note 36, at 361–419. In reality, the process is likely closer to reflective
equilibrium than the more linear account in the text suggests. Id.
38
Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191.
36
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called inclusive positivists,39 we understand law as including pretty much
anything that the contingent ultimate rule of recognition 40 recognizes as
law, and thus that a society recognizes as law, then law can include almost
any conceivable source of guidance or enlightenment or anything else, as
long as the relevant recognizers have in fact recognized it. 41 For the
inclusive positivists, law could include the commands of morality, the
commands of God, or the prescriptions and predictions of astrology as
long as the social forces that “choose” an ultimate rule of recognition have
decided that to be the case.42 This position is potentially problematic,
however, because it appears to suggest, or at least allow, that all sorts of
propositions of grammar, semantics, arithmetic, empirical fact, and much
else can count as law, which seems initially not only to be highly
counterintuitive, but also inconsistent with the way in which law is
commonly understood to be a particular kind of subset of, and not
coextensive with, the field of existing social norms and social facts. 43

See KENNETH EINAR HIMMA, THE NATURE OF LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN
CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY 252–70 (2011) (exploring the distinction
between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism); Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal
Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241 (Dennis
Patterson ed. 1996) (discussing the traditions behind different versions of legal positivism);
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 294–312 (1998)
(identifying the dilemmas facing an incorporationist under the rule of recognition); Kenneth
Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125 (Jules Coleman, Scott Shapiro & Kenneth Einar Himma eds. 2002)
(outlining the conceptual framework of legal positivism).
40
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (examining the idea of a rule of recognition).
See also THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Matthew D. Adler &
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).
41
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that the rule of recognition might
cover a vast breadth of potential sources of law).
42
Hart uses the term “accept” to designate the process by which those who choose, adopt,
or use the ultimate rule of recognition come to take it as authoritative, HART, supra note 32,
at 90–98, and for him the relevant accepters are officials. There are important questions about
whether locating the relevant within the class of officials is correct, and we might instead
locate the source of ultimate acceptance within a society as public opinion, broadly
understood, or even the views of an ultimate repository of force such as the army, but I will
say nothing more about that question on this occasion. On the question in general, see
generally Matthew Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 720 (2006) (exploring “popular constitutionalism”
and its moral implications within modern society).
43
See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1944 (2004). See
also Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2002) (objecting to
inclusive positivism because, inter alia, “positivism rescued in this way can no longer claim
to show what is distinctive about law and legal reasoning, because once we accept the
strategy, we can easily regard any community’s moral practices as resting on convention in
the same way.”).
39
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Although an excessively capacious understanding of the kinds of
things that can count as law appears counterintuitive and misleading, the
opposite approach seems problematic as well. According to the so-called
exclusive positivists, of whom Joseph Raz 44 and Scott Shapiro,45 are
exemplary, and Hans Kelsen is at least one inspiration, 46 only norms (and
other inputs) of a certain type can count as law. 47 This seems from one
perspective more faithful to the reality of legal life, a reality in which the
practice of legal argument and the techniques of legal decision making
involve much more than law, and a reality in which law constitutes only
a subset of the acceptable inputs into legal argument, legal reasoning, and
legal decision-making. This approach too has its flaws, for it may wind
up explaining too little of what lawyers and judges actually use and
actually do. Raz, for example, insists on a distinction between law and
legal reasoning,48 but if the techniques of, and the inputs into, legal
reasoning are largely not understood as law, then it is puzzling to see just
how much work the category of law is actually doing.49
In the face of this controversy about how we should understand law
in the largest sense, or about how we should understand a certain usage
of the word “law,” my preferred strategy is to distance myself. Here, and
elsewhere, I will leave the definition of “law” to others, and leave the non44
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 17 (2d ed.
2009); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 9 (2d ed. 1999) (1975). See also Andrei
Marmor, Exclusive Legal Positivism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 104–05
(describing Raz as an exclusive positivist).
45
See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 269–73 (2011); Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the
Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000). See also Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard
Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355, 360 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
46
See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1967) (1960). I am thinking
in particular of Kelsen’s view that no legal act is completely determined by the law, a position
well captured by his metaphor of law being akin to a frame without a picture. See id. at 350–
51. See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 20–21 (Sari Bashi trans. 2005)
(noting Kelsen’s comparison of law to that of a frame); Ines Weyland, Idealism and Realism in
Kelsen’s Treatment of Norm Conflicts, in ESSAYS ON KELSEN 249, 258–60 (Richard Tur & William
Twining eds., 1986) (referring to Kelsen’s assumption that one can determine the frame of a
norm). JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: IN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
LEGAL SYSTEM 63 (2d ed., 1980), relies heavily on Kelsen, supporting the inference of a
connection between Kelsen and exclusive positivism.
47
See RAZ, supra note 44, at 122–23.
48
See JOSEPH RAZ, Postema on Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reason, in BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 376 (2009) (distinguishing between law and legal
reasoning).
49
See Schauer, supra note 43. For Dworkin’s somewhat different objections to exclusive
legal positivism, See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 1666–79. Throughout his extensive writings
on law and legal theory, Dworkin studiously avoided ever giving a definition of “law,” or
even very much of an analysis of just what law was, except for the implicit claim in all of his
writings that law was simply what lawyers, judges, and the legal system do. Id.
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semantic question of just what law is to others, preferring instead the more
modest goal of thinking about just what kind of materials, sources, inputs,
and other “stuff” do or do not count as sociologically legitimate in legal
argument and legal decision-making. An important question about law,
or at least what I take to be an important question about how law and legal
argument and legal decision-making actually operate, is the identification
of the acceptable (and unacceptable) source and references in a brief or
oral argument, the acceptable (and unacceptable) moves in legal
argument, and the acceptable (and unacceptable) authorities on which a
judge may rely in a judicial opinion. Although I confess to sympathies
with defining the acceptable side of each of these dichotomies as “law,”
nothing turns on this potentially controversial (especially within the
contemporary analytic jurisprudential community) move, and I can be
satisfied with saying that the question is important, even apart from
whether the answer tells us much (or anything) about the nature of law
itself. And from this perspective, I want only to claim that insofar as there
is a disagreement about the types of materials, sources, and inputs that
count as acceptable or sociologically legitimate, this is a disagreement that
in one potentially interesting sense can be understood as a theoretical
disagreement. Whether this is a theoretical disagreement about law, or a
theoretical disagreement of another kind, is a fight, at least here, in which
I have no dog.
VI. A HISTORY OF DISAGREEMENT
A number of historical controversies represent theoretical
disagreements of just this variety, theoretical disagreements about what
materials and sources are to count (or not to count) as law. If we go back
to the nineteenth century, for example, we discover, amusingly to
contemporary common law sensibilities, that some number of
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s students complained that his teaching,
which was dominated by exposition of cases, was “not law.” 50 For them,
as for most pre-Langdellian lawyers, scholars, and students in the prenineteenth century common law world, law consisted of enduring legal
principles51 that might happen to be exemplified by cases, and that would
typically be collected in learned treatises, but the cases were mere

Joseph Beale, Professor Langdell – His Later Teaching Days, 20 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10 (1906).
The pre-Langdell idea is well-captured by Holmes’s mocking reference to those legal
principles as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
50
51
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examples of law, or evidence of law, 52 and not law itself.53 Thus when
Langdell featured cases in his writings and teaching, 54 and when he did
so based on his assumption that the cases were law (or sources of law) and
not simply evidence of law,55 he was departing from the historical
understanding of just what materials did and did not count as law itself.56
The disagreement between Langdell and most of those who preceded him,
Blackstone perhaps most prominently, was thus a disagreement about just
what counted as law, and was accordingly, at least under the definition I
am presupposing here, a theoretical disagreement.
Similar controversies exist in the present. Consider, for example, the
contemporary controversy about the use by American courts of foreign
law.57 Although American courts have long made reference to and
arguably relied on law from non-American jurisdictions,58 such use has
been sporadic, and the contemporary controversy dates largely from the
Supreme Court’s seeming reliance, over objection, on the authority of
foreign law in cases dealing with the juvenile death penalty,59 with the
death penalty for those with mental impairments, 60 and with homosexual
sodomy.61 In these cases, and in the vast commentary that they have
spawned,62 the proponents of the use of foreign law can be understood to
52
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *69 (describing
judicial decisions as the most authoritative “evidence” that can be given to the existence of a
law).
53
See id. at *66.
54
See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 964–66 (2009) (describing Langdell’s then-novel use
of cases in teaching).
55
See James Schouler, Cases without Treatises, 23 AM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1889) (analyzing
Langdell’s use of cases).
56
See id. at 1 (distinguishing Langdell’s approach to cases from the teaching of his
Harvard predecessors).
57
See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988). Compare Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005)
(offering a sympathetic account of American uses of foreign law), with Ernest A Young,
Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005) (presenting a less
sympathetic perspective).
58
Including in Riggs itself.
59
Compare Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830–31 (relying on law of other jurisdictions), with
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859, 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to use of foreign law).
60
Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citing to foreign law), with Atkins,
536 U.S. at 321–22 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (questioning use of foreign law); and Atkins,
536 U.S. at 337, 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
61
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (explaining English legal
development regarding sodomy), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that constitutional entitlements do not come about because foreign nations have
decriminalized the action).
62
See, e.g., Angioletta Sperti, United States of America: First Cautious Attempts of Judicial Use
of Foreign Precedents in the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS
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be claiming that the field of law includes foreign law, and thus that the
existence of a precedent from a similar (and admired) country can and
should be considered authoritative, even if not conclusively so. 63 By
contrast, opponents64 of the use of foreign law as having precedential or
authoritative value typically worry about the problem of Americans not
being represented in the process of making foreign law, or about our
ability to understand the context of the foreign precedents that are being
cited.65 But my goal here is not to delve into whether it is the proponents
or the opponents who are correct about the use of foreign law by American
courts. Rather, the point is simply to observe that the proponents and the
opponents are disagreeing not about how to interpret, say, Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, nor about how to
understand a decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, nor
about whether to include the law of Poland in an agreed-upon field of
relevant foreign law. Rather, those who dispute about the use of foreign
law are disagreeing about whether foreign law, as a type of source,
belongs in the category of legitimate legal inputs, or legitimate sources of
law.66 It is a dispute about what counts as American law, which is a subset
of the question of what counts as law.

BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 393, 403–04 (Marie-Claire Ponthoreau & Tania Gropp eds., 2013)
(noting Chief Justice Marshall’s use of laws from England in the Rose v. Himely decision). See
also ELAINE MAK, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF WESTERN HIGHEST COURTS 170 (2013); Ganesh
Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 653, 654–55 (2009); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the
United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 854 (2012).
63
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 115 (2005); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better
than Knowing More: Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2006). See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER:
A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 80 (2009) (describing the foreign law
controversy); Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1940 (2008)
(same, and questioning the idea of persuasive authority).
64
In addition to the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, supra notes 59–
61, see Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291,
294–95 (2005); Richard A. Posner, No Thanks—We Already Have Our Own Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
July–August 2004, at 40; Richard A. Posner, Judicial Cosmopolitanism, in HOW JUDGES THINK
347, 347–50 (2008) [hereinafter Posner, Judicial Cosmopolitanism].
65
See Posner, Judicial Cosmopolitanism, supra note 64, at 347–50.
66
Famously, John Chipman Gray distinguished law from the sources of law, e.g., JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (2d. ed. 1921), but if we understand law
itself as largely–or perhaps even intrinsically or necessarily–a source based enterprise, see
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 44, at 45–54, 62–66; RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 210–14, the distinction between law and the sources of law seems,
to put it gently, peculiar.
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Much the same characterization can be applied to another
contemporary controversy, the one about the propriety of use by appellate
courts of so-called non-legal information. 67 Consider, for example, Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants,68 the case
in which the Supreme Court rejected, on First Amendment grounds,
California’s attempt to restrict juveniles’ access to violent interactive video
games.69 The substance of the decision is not important here, but it is
noteworthy that Justice Breyer in his dissent cited a large number of
empirical studies about the effect of videogames and related images on
behavior, studies that Justice Breyer argued served to establish the
reasonableness of California’s challenged regulation.70 In response,
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority observed, plainly with an edge,
that none of the information offered by Justice Breyer had been part of the
record in the case.71 Apart from their differences about video games and
about the First Amendment, therefore, it is clear that Justices Breyer and
Scalia had a disagreement about the extent to which non-legal sources that
were not part of the litigation at trial, not part of the appellate record, and
not part of any of the briefs of the parties were appropriate sources of
information and guidance for appellate decision-making.72 Once again,
the disagreement was really about what is to count as a legitimate input
into a legal decision, or what is to be considered an acceptable source for
an appellate judge to use or cite, and thus it was a disagreement that, in
the sense that I am using that idea here, was a theoretical one.
Indeed, the disagreement about the kind of information that Justice
Breyer used in Entertainment Merchants is a disagreement likely to have
more lasting relevance and salience than the disagreement about the use
of foreign law.73 Some of this lasting relevance is a product of Justice
Breyer’s own approach to appellate adjudication, for in some number of
other cases he has also gone beyond the record, the briefs, and facts found
67
See Schauer & Wise, supra note 8, at 496 (documenting the growing judicial use of nonlegal sources).
68
See 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2761–71 (2011).
69
See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 99–100
(2011) (discussing the First Amendment aspects of the case).
70
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2761–71.
71
Id. at 2739 n.8.
72
See generally Layne S. Keele, When the Mountain Goes to Mohammed: The Internet and
Judicial Decision-Making, 45 N.M. L. REV. 125, 148 (2014) (discussing the use of non-legal
sources as used by Supreme Court Justices); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court
Factfinding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1302–03 (2012) (providing examples of non-legal sources
used by the Supreme Court Justices); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge:
Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 142–44 (2008) (describing how the
internet has affected the judicial fact-finding process).
73
See Larsen, supra note 72, at 1279–80.
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at trial in bringing so-called non-legal information to bear on the appellate
process.74 In the important Commerce Clause case of United States v.
Lopez,75 for example, Justice Breyer, again in dissent, similarly used a wide
array of independently-located empirical information to argue that the
availability of guns in the public schools did indeed have an effect on
interstate commerce, which was the question at issue in that case.76 Of less
significance, Justice Breyer made (slight) use of his independently-located
book, How to Buy and Care for Tires, in his majority opinion in the important
expert evidence case of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.77 And of potentially
even greater importance, Justice Breyer, once again dissenting, relied
heavily on facts and information that he and his law clerks were able to
locate from various (presumably public) sources about the very party in
the case before him in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1.78
Although I have mentioned several opinions by Justice Breyer, it is
worth noting that Judge Posner has adopted much the same approach,
and has unashamedly described and defended his practice of engaging in
post-brief and post-argument independent factual and empirical research
to acquaint himself with what he feels he needs to know to make the best
decision in the case before him.79 As with Justice Breyer’s practices, Judge
Posner’s have not been without controversy,80 in part because they raise
important due process issues about notice to opposing parties and
information obtained outside of the adversary process, and in part
because they may be in some tension with traditional notions of judicial
notice.81 But as with the dispute about the use of foreign law in
constitutional (especially) adjudication, the dispute about extra-legal
sources and independent judicial research is not one I seek to resolve, or
even to enter, on this occasion. Rather, I use that dispute, along with
others, to identify a particular kind of dispute—a dispute about whether
some category of sources, or some category of information—shall be
considered acceptable in contemporary legal argument and legal decisionmaking.

Id.
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
76
Id. at 1659.
77
See 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1172 (1999).
78
See 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2800, 2801–10, 2837–41 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79
See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 131–48 (2013).
80
See Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 638 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
81
See Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
51, 60–61, 65–66 (2013).
74
75
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VII. CONCLUSION
The argument that I have offered in this Article is thus a simple one.
An important form of disagreement in law is now, and has been for
centuries, about what kinds of materials, sources, inputs, considerations,
norms, and what-have-you will be understood as legitimate sources or
authorities for legal argument and legal decisions. If one accepts, broadly,
a Hartian rule of recognition account of law, then the character of law in a
jurisdiction—a legal community—will be determined by the content of the
ultimate rule of recognition.82
More particularly, however, the character of law, legal argument, and
legal decision-making in a community will be determined by the types of
sources or inputs that are recognized by the ultimate rule of recognition. 83
This will determine not only what lawyers will argue, how judges will
decide, and what authorities lawyers and judges will use in their briefs
and opinions, but also what courses will be taught at institutions that
designate themselves as law schools, what materials will be part of such
courses, what subjects will be included on bar examinations designed to
certify individuals as lawyers, and what answers on bar examinations will
be deemed acceptable by the examiners. In other words, a host of
particular institutions are part of the sociologically differentiated general

82
It is part of Dworkin’s attack on legal positivism that fundamental disagreements about
what is recognized by the rule of recognition are inconsistent with the purpose that a rule of
recognition is designed to serve, a purpose that requires some degree of consensus among
participants in the legal system. See Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Rule of Recognition (and Does
it Exist?), in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 235,
260–63. Thus, Dworkin appears to presuppose a view of the point of positivism that derives
from the law-reform goals that produced the normative positivism of Jeremy Bentham, and
that require a degree of guidance and specificity about what counts as law. See Frederick
Schauer, The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism, 101 VA. L. REV. 957 (2015). And although I
believe that there is much to be said, both historically and normatively, for Bentham’s
understanding of legal positivism and for the normative foundations on which it rests, it is
clear that much of contemporary legal positivist theory in the analytic tradition has taken a
different path. Insofar as this is true, therefore, Dworkin and contemporary positivists seem
simply to be talking past each other. Moreover, if we understand the rule of recognition
account as based simply on recognizing that what is or is not law is a social determination,
then nothing in this skeleton of an account requires that this recognition produce or take the
form of a rule. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 77 (2d series) (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). See also Schauer, supra note 20, at
173; Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1558–
59 (1997). And if the core idea of the rule of recognition is compatible with the rule of
recognition being a fluid and substantially amorphous social practice, and if identifying it as
a social practice is the basic positivist insight, then nothing about the looseness of the practice
is essential to legal positivism, thus rendering Dworkin’s critique largely beside the point.
83
See Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, supra note 5, at 1927–28.
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institution of law,84 and the character of that general institution will be
closely connected with—dependent on, in a stronger version of the
claim—the difference between the sources that are considered part of that
institution and the sources that are not. And although similar claims
might be made about other social institutions, those claims have a special
resonance and importance when the institution is itself a source-based
one, as law almost certainly is.
Because the sociological legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain sources
or inputs is so central to the idea of law, when there is disagreement about
which types of sources or inputs do or should count as law—when there
is disagreement about which types of sources or inputs are or should be
recognized by the ultimate rule of recognition—we have what in an
interesting way is a theoretical disagreement about the law in some legal
community. This is not a theoretical disagreement about the nature of law
in all possible legal systems in all possible worlds, but at least for some of
us the fact that this theoretical disagreement exists at a sub-conceptual
level is far more a virtue than a vice.

84
See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 235–37 (Elizabeth King-Utz &
Martin Albrow trans. 1985) (1972).
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